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REINTEGRATION OF FEMALE RAPE SURVIVORS: THE
OVERLOOKED PRIORITY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN
THE FACE OF MASS WARTIME RAPE
ABSTRACT
While mass wartime rape has become a core characteristic of
modern armed conflict, transitional justice mechanisms have con-
tinuously failed to bring about successful achievement of justice,
reconciliation, and truth for female survivors.1 The abuse, exile, and
humiliation of large numbers of female rape survivors by their fam-
ilies and communities leaves entire societies destabilized and sus-
ceptible to prolonged instability and state failure, thus obstructing
attempts by transitional justice mechanisms to usher in long-lasting
peace and stability.2 To achieve more successful post-conflict recon-
struction, transitional justice mechanisms situated in the aftermath
of wars marked by mass rape must first focus on the reintegration
of rape survivors. Positive reintegration can lead to greater success
in transitional justice as a whole through greater survivor participa-
tion, a greater chance for restoration of survivor and community dig-
nity, and an increase in survivor and community trust in the process
as a whole, eventually leading to a domino effect on the success of
subsequent goals of the mechanism and the mechanism itself.3
INTRODUCTION
I. MASS WARTIME RAPE’S OBSTRUCTION OF POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION: EFFECTS ON THE INDIVIDUAL, THE FAMILY,
AND THE COMMUNITY
II. THE CURRENT GOALS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE FACE
OF MASS WARTIME RAPE
A. An Overview of Transitional Justice
B. Transitional Justice and Mass Wartime Rape
1. Rwandan Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunal
2. Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
3. Guatemala’s Tribunal of Conscience
1. See What is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://
www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice [https://perma.cc/4CXQ-WH3T].
2. See Cassandra Clifford, Rape as a Weapon of War and Its Long-Term Effects on
Victims and Society, 7TH GLOBAL CONFERENCE ON VIOLENCE & CONTEXTS HOSTILITY (May
2018), https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/vaw_rapeasaweaponofwar_stop
modern slavery_may2008_0.pdf.
3. See What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
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III. REINTEGRATION AS THE OVERLOOKED GOAL OF TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
A. Effects of Reintegration on Transitional Justice
B. Two Sides of the Same Coin: Greater Participation or
Stagnant and Declining Participation
IV. WHICH OUTCOME IS MORE LIKELY IN FUTURE CASES?: THE
CASES OF SYRIA AND SOUTH SUDAN
A. Syria
1. Overview of Wartime Rape Amidst the Syrian
Conflict
2. Post-Conflict Syria and Future Reintegration
B. South Sudan
1. Overview of Wartime Rape Within the South
Sudanese Conflict
2. Post-Conflict South Sudan and Future Reintegration
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
While transitional justice traditionally prioritizes adjudication,
the end to impunity, reconciliation, truth, and justice for female
survivors of mass wartime rape, it overlooks the immediate need for
survivors to be reintegrated back into their families and communi-
ties.4 Critiques of transitional justice—as they relate to mass war-
time rape—attack such mechanisms for lack of effectiveness, lack of
justice for survivors, lack of training of legal staff in gender sensitiv-
ity and trauma-informed advocacy, and lack of effective individual
and societal healing in the face of societal norms regarding rape, sub-
sequently stifling the participation of survivors in transitional jus-
tice and ultimate post-conflict change in views on rape and sexual
violence.5 However, where transitional justice mechanisms prioritize
the reintegration of female rape survivors into post-conflict society
prior to other goals, there is a greater chance for successful prosecu-
torial or non-prosecutorial processes, post-conflict reconstruction,
and long-term peace and stability.6
This Note seeks to advance the adoption and prioritization of
the overlooked goal of reintegration of female rape survivors in post-
conflict society by transitional justice mechanisms following conflict
4. See id.
5. See CATHERINE TURNER, Transitional Justice and Critique, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1, 52–53 (Cheryl Lawther et al. eds., 2017).
6. See What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
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marked by mass wartime rape.7 Namely, if the reintegration of female
survivors of mass wartime rape is the first and initial goal in transi-
tional justice procedures, two possible outcomes will emerge. In the
first case, where societal response to reintegration is positive, reinte-
gration of survivors may lead to a surge in the percentage of survivors
participating in transitional justice procedures on sexual violence,
and ultimately, a greater chance for restoration of their human and
civil dignity, as well as their trust in the procedures.8 The second pos-
sible outcome emerges where societal response to reintegration is
negative, thus inhibiting participation, dignity restoration, and ulti-
mate trust in the procedure.9
The focus of this Note is not the process by which such reinte-
gration will come about, but rather its necessity and the possible
consequences for transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction
if such a goal is adopted. Part I of this Note will first discuss the post-
conflict consequences mass wartime rape imposes on the individual
female survivor, her family, and her community, and thus, on the post-
conflict reconstruction process as a whole, which cumulatively serve
as barriers to effective transitional justice.10 Part II will present an
overview of current goals of transitional justice before focusing on
how those goals have failed to be achieved within procedures in
Rwanda, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone, which were specifically de-
signed to review, in part, instances of wartime rape and sexual vio-
lence.11 Part III establishes the reasons why reintegration of female
survivors back into their families and communities can lead to more
successful transitional justice, and ultimately, post-conflict recon-
struction. Part III will also describe the two possible outcomes of
reintegration prioritization and their ability to meet the needs of
female survivors, before predicting in Part IV which outcome is most
likely to occur if transitional justice mechanisms prioritize reinte-
gration in future post-conflict Syria and South Sudan.
7. See Paul Seils, The Place of Reconciliation in Transitional Justice, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUST. (June 2017), https://www.ictj.org/publication/reconciliation-transi
tional-justice [https://perma.cc/TR84-YYYT].
8. See What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
9. See Nicola Jones et al., The Fallout of Rape as a Weapon of War: The Life-Long
and Intergenerational Impacts of Sexual Violence in Conflict, OVERSEAS DEV. INST. (June
2014), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/89
90.pdf.
10. See Jeanne Ward & Mendy Marsh, Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in
War and Its Aftermath: Realities, Responses, and Required Resources, SYMP. ON SEXUAL
VIOLENCE CONFLICT & BEYOND (June 2006), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi
-assets/publications-opinion-files/8990.pdf.
11. See What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
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I. MASS WARTIME RAPE’S OBSTRUCTION OF POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION: EFFECTS ON THE INDIVIDUAL, THE
FAMILY, AND THE COMMUNITY
Mass wartime rape is an obstacle to successful post-conflict
reconstruction process.12 Post-conflict reconstruction has been placed
under the jurisdiction of transitional justice mechanisms estab-
lished in the aftermath of armed conflict since the 1990s in response
to atrocities seen in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Liberia, South Africa,
Guatemala, and the former Yugoslavia, to name a few.13 Following
war marked by such large-scale sexual violence, female survivors
are impeded by cultural stigmas, practices, and beliefs concerning
rape from retaining their place as the foundation of their families
and communities, and rather face exile, ostracization, rejection, and
abuse.14 These responses ensure that such fractured communities
can never truly be repaired in post-conflict reconstruction without
a proper legal response that prioritizes their reintegration.15
Mass rape is defined as “a systematic form of warfare carried
out on the female body for strategic ends by both rebel groups and
state forces; where [on] a massive scale, women and girls are subjected
to sexual, physical invasion under coercive circumstances.”16 Female
survivors of mass wartime range from infants to the elderly, and can
be civilians, refugees, or abducted soldiers.17 However, mass war-
time rape exhibits far-reaching effects beyond the individual female
survivor: to assault and fragment their family and community.18 It
is not a crime against the individual woman, but a targeted and delib-
erate crime against her community for the purpose of assaulting and
destabilizing it.19 The systematic use of rape is a tactic of modern
armed conflict meant to terrorize and destroy a population, “break
up families, destroy communities, and, in some instances, change
the ethnic make-up of the next generation.”20 Transitional justice
mechanisms within reconstruction processes play a crucial role in
12. See Layla Abi-Falah, Silent No Longer: Reintegrating Female Rape Survivors in
Post-Conflict Society, PROJECT ON INT’L PEACE & SEC. 1, 3 (2017).
13. See Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations,
Background Information on Sexual Violence Used as a Tool of War, U.N., https://www
.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8990.pdf [hereinafter
Background Information on Sexual Violence].
14. See Jocelyn Kelly et al., Experiences of Female Survivors of Sexual Violence in
Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Mixed-Methods Study, 5 CONFLICT & HEALTH
1, 4 (Nov. 2011) [hereinafter Kelley et al., Experiences of Female Survivors].
15. See Ward & Marsh, supra note 10.
16. See Abi-Falah, supra note 12, at 3.
17. See Ward & Marsh, supra note 10.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Background Information on Sexual Violence, supra note 13.
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trying to reverse or ameliorate these effects in order to usher in
long-term peace and stability.21
Female survivors experience continued suffering and conse-
quences long after their rape.22 While the sources of such suffering
and consequences vary, this Note will focus on the particular conse-
quence of familial and communal rejection, as this is the ultimate
goal of mass wartime rape.23
Rape survivors are rejected, exiled, ostracized, and abused by
their family and community due to societal norms and attitudes
against rape such that survivors are rejected from their husbands’
and/or parents’ homes.24 In fact, the men within a survivor’s family—
including fathers, brothers, sons, and husbands—are considered indi-
rect victims of rape, and are prioritized in post-conflict reconstruction
for their loss of honor, while survivors’ loss of personal security is dis-
missed.25 These men are traditionally seen as the protectors of their
families tasked with the social duty and responsibility of preventing
the rape of their wives, daughters, sisters, and mothers.26 Thus, the
rape of such female family members leads to an intense sense of
failure—an illustration of the destructive ability of this war tactic to
dominate the targeted community and underline its supposed inade-
quacy.27 Faced with such failure, these men rationalize the rejection
of rape survivors as justified, exemplifying the debilitating societal
norms that underline rape which punish female survivors and coddle
male indirect victims.28
21. See What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
22. See generally Jones et al., supra note 9.
23. See Background Information on Sexual Violence, supra note 13.
24. See Kelly et al., Experiences of Female Survivors, supra note 14, at 4; see also
Aryn Baker, The Secret War Crime, TIME (Mar. 10, 2016), https://time.com/war-and-rape
[https://perma.cc/2BJY-U4HQ].
25. See Mary V. Carter, Exile and Reintegration among Rape Survivors in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo: Factors Influencing Rejection and Acceptance, UNC SCH. NURSING
16 (2011), https://nursing.unc.edu/files/2012/11/Exile-and-Reintegration-Among-Rape-Sur
vivors-in-the-Democratic-Repoublic-of-Congo-M-Carter.pdf; see also Jones et al., supra note
9, at 6.
26. See Susan Bartels, Now the World Is Without Me: An Investigation of Sexual Vio-
lence in Eastern DRC, HARV. HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE 5 (Apr. 2010), https://hhi.harvard
.edu/publications/now-world-without-me-investigation-sexual-violence-eastern-democratic
-republic-congo [https://perma.cc/6TF9-BD7N]; Megan Mackenzie, Securitizing Sex? To-
wards a Theory of the Utility of Wartime Sexual Violence, 12 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 202,
208 (May 2010); see also Megan Bradley et al., Preventing and Responding to Sexual
Violence in Conflict: Next Steps in a Global Struggle, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 2013), https://
www.brookings.edu/events/preventing-and-responding-to-sexual-violence-in-conflict
-next-steps-in-a-global-struggle [https://perma.cc/G6CV-CBKE].
27. See Bartels, supra note 26, at 5, 28; Mackenzie, supra note 26, at 208; Bradley et
al., supra note 26.
28. See Jocelyn Kelly et al., ‘If Your Husband Doesn’t Humiliate You, Other People
Won’t’: Gendered Attitudes Towards Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of
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A survivor of gang rape in the Democratic Republic of Congo
was quoted to have said:
Your husband will say he cannot keep a woman who has been
raped by the whole battalion, and he will repudiate you. When
you go to your parents’ house, they will ask you why you have
destroyed your marriage. . . . Your husband is the first person to
reject you [after rape], and then comes your family.29
The ripple effects do not cease there, as women and girls are
subsequently subjected to communal rejection.30 Survivors are severely
ostracized by fellow community members such that they are forced
to leave the community.31 In some cases, leaving the community is
even necessary to avoid honor killings meant to restore familial and
communal honor, which is significantly tied to the control of female
sexual activity.32 Women are viewed as impure as a result of having
sex outside of their marriage, thus bringing misfortune to their home
and community, leading some to perceive them as collaborators with
enemy attackers.33 The chances for such rejection are increased sig-
nificantly for survivors who bear children of rape, who become widows
or are abandoned by their husbands, or who were captured or gang-
raped.34 Health effects—such as the contraction or fear of contraction
of HIV/AIDS, the inability to reproduce, the gut-wrenching smell of
torn fistulas, and the lessened ability to conduct laborious agricultural
or domiciliary tasks from physical or mental wounds—worsen the
response of family and community members.35 For example, hus-
bands fear HIV/AIDS “contamination” from wives, regardless of the
Congo, 7 GLOBAL PUB. HEALTH 285, 291–92 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter Kelley et al., If Your
Husband Doesn’t Humiliate You]. See also Baker, supra note 24.
29. Kelly et al., Experiences of Female Survivors, supra note 14, at 5.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Madrespeaks, Women Confronting ISIS: How Can We End Rape as a Weapon
of War?, YOUTUBE (Mar. 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GzlBPKwbPJM [https://
perma.cc/4566-BG3N] [hereinafter Madrespeaks, Women Confronting ISIS].
33. For example, women who become pregnant following their rape are seen as collabo-
rators in the sense that they are harboring a child whose father attempted to destroy the
community. See Clifford, supra note 2; Mackenzie, supra note 26, at 212–13; Kelly et al.,
Experiences of Female Survivors, supra note 14, at 4–5; Kelly et al., If Your Husband
Doesn’t Humiliate You, supra note 28, at 290; Carolyn Nordstrom, Rape: Politics and The-
ory in War and Peace, 11 AUSTL. FEMINIST STUD. 147, 152–53 (1996); Sexual Violence as a
Weapon of War, UNICEF (1996), http://www.unicef.org/sowc96pk/sexvio.htm [https://per
ma.cc/52H3-8Z2L]; see also LaShawn R. Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and
Women’s Status, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2004), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/402bac094.pdf.
34. See Carter, supra note 25, at 10–14.
35. See id. at 10; Jones et al., supra note 9, at 2–3; Kelly et al., Experiences of Female
Survivors, supra note 14, at 5–6; Baker, supra note 24; see also Bartels, supra note 26,
at 41–43.
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lack of empirical data to support such a fear.36 Thus, as a result of
cultural stigma, women who were once the foundation of their com-
munity are rejected, exiled, abused, or even killed, and the commu-
nity subsequently becomes unstable—an undeniable illustration of
the power of rape as a strategic weapon of war.37
In summary, prior to the start of transitional justice processes
established in the aftermath of conflict marked by mass wartime
rape, transitional justice mechanisms face a society that has been
torn apart on the individual, familial, and communal levels by sexual
violence—an overwhelming and seemingly insurmountable barrier
to effective justice, reconciliation, and long-term peace and stability.38
II. THE CURRENT GOALS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE
FACE OF MASS WARTIME RAPE
The international regime regarding transitional justice, specifi-
cally regarding the prosecution of gender-based crimes within tran-
sitional justice, is still in its infancy, claiming only three decades of
substantial progress since the early 1990s.39 However, since the
early nineties, the world has seen a dramatic increase in the use of
various transitional justice mechanisms from reparations payments,
to international criminal courts and tribunals, to intrastate institu-
tions in response to grave violations of human rights, including mass
wartime rape.40
A. An Overview of Transitional Justice
Transitional justice refers to the process nations undergo upon
emerging from armed conflict or repression to respond to and ad-
dress widespread violations of human rights.41 It can take on many
forms, both prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial, including criminal
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, reform of
national laws and regimes, and memorialization efforts.42
Ruti G. Teitel, professor at law at New York Law School and spe-
cialist in the area of international law and transitional justice, speaks
of a genecology of transitional justice, moving from Phase I—or
36. See Carter, supra note 25, at 10; Jones et al., supra note 9, at 2; Kelly et al.,
Experiences of Female Survivors, supra note 14, at 5–6; Baker, supra note 24; see also
Bartels, supra note 26, at 42–43.
37. See Clifford, supra note 2; Ward & Marsh, supra note 10.
38. See supra Part I.
39. See Brownwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,
30 HUM. RTS. Q. 95, 98–99 (2008); see also What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
40. See RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, The Pursuit of International Justice, in INT’L ORG.
& GLOB. GOVERNANCE 481 (Thomas G. Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson eds., 2014).
41. See Seils, supra note 7; What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
42. See What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
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post–World War II conceptions of transitional justice—to Phase
II—or post–Cold War transitional justice—to, finally, Phase III, and
current conceptions of transitional justice.43 Phase I post-war mech-
anisms focused on the goal of justice, retribution, and punishment
through prosecutory forums such as the Nuremburg Trials.44 How-
ever, Phase II, following the “impasse on the question of transitional
justice” during the Cold War, saw such mechanisms play a key role
in the accelerated democratization of Latin America, Africa, and
Eastern Europe, as it focused on “construct[ing] an alternative history
of past abuses,” leading to the emergence of truth commissions.45 No
longer was the goal of such mechanisms justice, but rather peace,
reconciliation, and forgiveness by victims and society.46 Thus, Phase
II mechanisms were victim-centered; a mode by which victims could
“reconcile and recover from past harms” through dialogues with
their perpetrators mediated by mechanism authorities.47 Over time,
transitional justice has been said to purport the goals of ending im-
punity for massive human rights violations and promoting account-
ability and redress, recognizing the dignity of victims of human rights
violations, promoting truth-telling, and preventing future human
rights violations.48 This has led to a debate within transitional justice
literature and practice over the employment of restorative justice—as
seen in truth commissions—versus retributive justice—as seen in
tribunals and hybrid courts, or courts that exhibit a mixture of in-
ternational and domestic legal elements.49 Ultimately, the goal and
type of mechanisms is context-specific.50
B. Transitional Justice and Mass Wartime Rape
In the post–World War II era, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribu-
nals exacerbated and perpetuated global silence around the issue of
gender-based sexual violence during war as they “failed to adequately
43. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 70
(2003) [hereinafter Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy]; Ruti G. Teitel, N.Y.U., https://
www.nyls.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/faculty_profiles/ruti_g_teitel [https://perma.cc/
LR3T-TR35].
44. See Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, supra note 43, at 72–74.
45. The stalemate that marked nearly all actions within Cold War era politics also
froze the progress of transitional justice. Id. at 70–78.
46. See id. at 77–78.
47. Id. at 80.
48. See Seils, supra note 7; see also What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
49. See BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. STYLE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). See
generally Raquel Aldana, A Victim-Centered Reflection on Truth Commissions and Prose-
cutions as a Response to Mass Atrocities, 5 J. ON HUM. RTS. 107 (2006).
50. See Ivan Simonovic, Attitudes and Types of Reaction Toward Past War Crimes
and Human Rights Abuses, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 343, 345–50 (2004).
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address and prosecute sexual violence, and no victims of rape were
called to testify at these proceedings.”51 However, this quickly changed
at the start of the 1990s, in response to the novel and systematic use
of rape as a tactic to destroy the Tutsi population in the Rwandan
Genocide and the former Yugoslavia.52
The elevation of rape as an international crime demanding
prosecution has several theoretical implications. First, the prosecu-
tion of rape “contributes to the preservation of post-conflict collective
memory by establishing a historical record of rape as a war crime.”53
Additionally, it signals rape’s new-found status as a war crime or
grave violation of humanitarian law, and consequently, a theoretical
end to its impunity.54 Finally, the process is a victim-centered ap-
proach, addressing the needs of survivors of mass wartime rape.55
By speaking their truth on traumatic experiences, survivors are able
to alleviate their “psychological burden of silence and repression” on
an individual and communal level.56
According to existing literature, the overall success of transi-
tional justice’s prosecution of mass wartime rape can be measured
by whether the mechanism encourages female survivor participa-
tion; whether the mechanism restores survivor dignity; and whether
participants have trust in the mechanism.57 These three measure-
ments align with the reality of post-conflict individuals, families,
and communities impacted by mass wartime rape, as participation
in these mechanisms, restoration of dignity, and trust in the mecha-
nism respond to the needs of these three levels of society.
First, to encourage participation, mechanisms need to overcome
the factors that limit female participation, which include: restricted
mobility, lack of resources, fear of retaliation, fear of bringing shame
to family and community, feelings of complicity, and ultimately, fear
of further rejection and ostracization from their families and com-
munities.58 Second, to restore rape survivors’ human and civil dig-
nity, procedures must be victim-centered, responding to the needs
of the women, namely, whether they desire a process surrounding
51. Nicola Henry, Witness to Rape: The Limits and Potential of International War
Crimes Trials for Victims of Wartime Sexual Violence, 3 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 114,
115 (2009).
52. Melissa Jeltsen, A Look Back At the Trial that Made Rape a War Crime, HUFFING-
TON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/rwanda-genocide-rape_n_5602
108 [https://perma.cc/N4ZD-8K5W].
53. Henry, supra note 51, at 115.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 117.
57. See id. at 119.
58. See id. at 120.
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truth and reconciliation or retribution and punishment.59 Finally,
mechanisms must encourage trust or faith in the “promise of the
law as an ethical force capable of restoring . . . equilibrium . . . .”60
However, since the beginning of gender-based violence prosecution
in the 1990s, transitional justice mechanisms have had mixed results
in meeting these three goals through their various procedures.61
1. Rwandan Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunal
For example, the Rwandan ad hoc international tribunal, es-
tablished by the United Nations Security Council in November 1994,
represents the commencement of several judicial precedents in the
field of gender-based criminal prosecution, as it was deemed the
trial in which rape became genocide, where its goal was adjudica-
tion, justice, and punishment.62 The guilty verdict of former mayor
Jean-Paul Akayesu, who was found to have encouraged and ordered
the rape and murder of Tutsi women by Hutus in a cultural center,
marked the first judgment for the crime of genocide under interna-
tional law.63 However, such progress was short-lived as further in-
dictments failed to include sexual violence charges, and the process
was marked by a lack of coordinated or consistent efforts to pursue
rape prosecutions.64 Participation of survivors was limited by the fact
that the tribunal was located in Tanzania, and in the face of stigma
against sexual violence, survivors had to overcome psychological,
social, and economic obstacles to testify.65 While the results of the
Akayesu verdict may have provided survivors who did participate or
those contemplating future participation a sense of restored dignity
and trust, the reality of the further cases did not.66 A rape survivor
from Rwanda who “initially cooperated with the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) later refused to participate ‘because
she had no faith in their protection efforts and she did not like the
way she was treated during her encounters with tribunal staff.’ ”67
Additionally, in such international criminal tribunals, survivors were
forced to describe their rape within the confines of legal language or
discourse that merely confirmed legal facts and elements rather than
59. Henry, supra note 51, at 121.
60. Id.
61. For example, the situations in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Guatemala. See infra
Sections II.B.1–3.
62. Jeltsen, supra note 52.
63. Id.
64. See Binaifer Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-Conflict
Justice for Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 99 (2005).
65. See Henry, supra note 51, at 121.
66. See Jeltsen, supra note 52.
67. Henry, supra note 51, at 121.
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the survivors’ emotional truth, thus failing to restore their dignity
and dis-incentivizing their participation in the process.68
In May 2008, genocide-related rape cases were transferred to
the gacaca courts—“traditional communal conflict resolution system[s]
used to resolve disputes in Rwanda”—and all three objectives of
survivor participation, dignity restoration, and trust in the mecha-
nism continued to see failure.69 Within these informal proceedings,
public participation in public forums was used to accuse perpetra-
tors of genocide.70 The goal of this mechanism was to “encourage
reconciliation and diffuse animosity amongst Rwandans by employ-
ing a traditional mechanism that involve[d] the entire community
in the prosecution of the perpetrators.”71 However, the public nature
of these proceedings, coupled with judicial incompetence and the
Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure’s approval of the identifica-
tion of survivors, only served to exacerbate the public ridicule faced
by survivors and solidified their ostracism, thus undercutting partic-
ipation, trust, and dignity.72 Additionally, gacaca courts were deemed
a failure in achieving their stated goal of reconciliation and unity,
as community-wide participation did not reconcile and unify the com-
munity.73 In fact, the experience of gacaca highlighted the difficul-
ties transitional justice mechanisms face in incorporating rape and
gender-based violence into their proceedings.74 Women felt skeptical
of participating in such a community-based process to share their
story that would only lead to their further rejection and fetishization
as rape survivors, as well as further suffering from being forced to
publicly “declare the trauma” they experienced.75
68. For example, during the FoĀa trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the following questioning took place between the prosecutor
and a rape survivor:
Q: When you say ‘rape’ what exactly do you mean?
A: I don’t understand your question.
Q: You said that this 40—this elderly man raped you. What exactly did he do?
A: He forced me onto the bed to take my clothes off and then he raped me,
he attacked me and raped me.
Q: Does it mean he put his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes.
Id. at 122, 125.
69. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 514 (4th ed. 2015); Brittany A. Olwine, Note, One Step
Forward, But Two Steps Back: Why Gacaca in Rwanda is Jeopardizing the Good Effect
of Akayesu on Women’s Rights, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 639, 651 (2011).
70. See Olwine, supra note 69, at 651–52.
71. Id. at 653.
72. See id. at 654–55.
73. See id. at 656.
74. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 69, at 514; Olwine, supra note 69, at 655.
75. Olwine, supra note 69, at 655.
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2. Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
the Special Court for Sierra Leone
However, such critiques do not always apply, as was the case of
transitional justice in Sierra Leone, marked by two mechanisms: the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court
for Sierra Leone.76 In May 2003, the TRC held hearings on violence
against women for three days.77 Unlike the gacaca court’s imprison-
ment of perpetrators as dictated by law, the Lomé Peace Accord, which
established the TRC, provided a blanket amnesty to all combatants,
thus ensuring that the goal of the mechanism was truth-telling and
reconciliation in response to the needs of the victims and society,
rather than adjudication.78 Unlike the untrained judges of the gacaca
courts, the TRC hired and incorporated gender-trained psychologists
and women’s rights non-governmental organization (NGO) mem-
bers, while also training their staff in gender-based violence aware-
ness and designating two experienced female investigators to sexual
assault investigations.79 Rape survivors were given the option to
speak at public hearings and be shielded by a screen or to speak
openly, thus allowing survivors to choose how public or private their
testimony would be, again, in stark contrast to the gacaca proce-
dure.80 There was a strong political will to effectively address sexual
violence, and the result was greater participation, greater restora-
tion of survivor dignity, and greater trust in the process.81
3. Guatemala’s Tribunal of Conscience
Not all truth-telling commissions see the same level of success
as Sierra Leone, as was the case in the two-day procedure that was
Guatemala’s “Tribunal of Conscience for Women Survivors of Sexual
Violence during the Armed Conflict in Guatemala.”82 The Tribunal
aimed to create a “public space for women survivors to tell their
truths and be heard by their fellow citizens and the state.”83 During
the Tribunal, survivors sat behind a curtain to conceal their identities
due to retaliatory safety concerns.84 This led to doubts by community
76. See Nowrojee, supra note 64, at 88.
77. See id. at 86.
78. See id. at 92.
79. See id. at 100.
80. See id. at 94.
81. See id. at 93–100.
82. Alison Crosby & M. Brinton Lykes, Mayan Women Survivors Speak: The Gen-
dered Relations of Truth Telling in Postwar Guatemala, 5 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST.
456, 457 (2011).
83. Id. at 470.
84. Id.
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members that real survivors were actually speaking rather than
rehearsed recordings, leading the organizers to shine a spotlight
from behind the curtain to show the women’s silhouettes.85 Ulti-
mately, this was a loss to the “dialogical nature of the truth-telling
processes between . . . survivors,” investigators, judges, and psychol-
ogists, as all were present behind the curtain and hidden from the
community.86 The reality of these proceedings defeated the ultimate
purpose of communal unity and reconciliation, and failed to allow
for trust in the process and restoration of dignity for the survivors.87
Additionally, participation was low, marked by only eight women.88
With Sierra Leone as the outlier, these examples illustrate how
current transitional justice mechanism goals of adjudication, truth,
reconciliation, and justice do not allow for a successful achievement
of participation, dignity restoration, or faith in female survivors, their
families, and communities during the prosecution of wartime rape.89
Moreover, even in the case of Sierra Leone—following transitional
justice and post-conflict reconstruction—rape survivors continue to
remain at the periphery of their community, thus leaving each nation
in a prolonged space of insecurity and illustrating the ultimate fail-
ure of the current goals of transitional justice.90
III. REINTEGRATION AS THE OVERLOOKED
GOAL OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Modern mechanisms of transitional justice prioritize goals of
accountability and an end to impunity through the establishment of
the rule of law, justice, truth, and reconciliation for victims of hu-
man rights violations, generally, and victims of mass wartime rape,
specifically.91 However, in the narrow case of mass wartime rape pro-
secution, an overlooked goal of transitional justice mechanisms is
the reintegration of female rape survivors into post-conflict society.
Literature and practice fail to provide a clear answer for the lack of
such prioritization previously.
Female rape survivor reintegration refers to the process by which
female rape survivors are welcomed back into their families and
communities in a manner that ensures a return to normal life fol-
lowing stigma-induced reactions against the survivor by the family
85. Id.
86. Id. at 471.
87. Id.
88. Crosby & Lykes, supra note 82, at 457.
89. Supra text accompanying notes 62–88.
90. See Bintu Conteh & Regina Pratt, Sierra Leone: Seeking Justice for Rape Survivors,
INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (2016), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/si erra-leone-seek
ing-justice-rape-survivors [https://perma.cc/W4VT-RQG3].
91. See What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
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and community.92 The word “integration” (and not “inclusion”) is used
because transitional justice should reflect a victim-centered approach,
and “integration” refers to willingness by the survivor “to belong and
integrate” within her family and society.93 “Inclusion”, on the other
hand, is “external” to the survivor’s will and agency.94
A. Effects of Reintegration on Transitional Justice
Transitional justice mechanisms suffer from the “first, then”
syndrome, where the current goals of justice, adjudication, reconcili-
ation, and truth, for example, are prioritized over reintegration, with
the belief that the results can lead to overall community unity—
which hypothetically includes survivors—but only after justice has
been achieved.95 However, prioritizing initial reintegration serves to
foster greater success in subsequent goals of transitional justice—
including truth, justice, reconciliation, and adjudication—as it can
foster a procedure where greater female survivor participation, trust,
and dignity restoration are successfully obtained.96
In ignoring the necessity of reintegration, current transitional
justice goals seem to ignore the reality on the ground.97 Because of
social stigmas described previously, even with the realization of the
current goals of transitional justice, the breakdown of the family and
community unit are never truly repaired, as female rape survivors
still remain on the periphery of their societies, thus ensuring future
instability.98 By placing reintegration of survivors as a first goal of
transitional justice—prior to adjudication, truth, or justice—such
mechanisms will allow for a more successful procedure and a
greater likelihood for successful post-conflict reconstruction and
long-term stability.
If transitional justice mechanisms do not account for initial survi-
vor reintegration, testimony of survivors may only serve, on the one
hand, to exacerbate their ostracization, thus undermining any success
92. See NIDAA ABU AWWAD, RE-INTEGRATION OF WOMEN SURVIVORS OF GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE: COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN PALESTINIAN SOCIETY 1, 14 (2016)
(ebook), accessed at: http://iws.birzeit.edu/sites/default/files/2017-02/Book%20Eng.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Cathy Russell, What’s the Problem with Women, Peace and Security? COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 2015), https://www.cfr.org/blog/whats-problem-women-peace-and-se
curity [https://perma.cc/9SKE-ST2D]; see Cristina Posa & Swanee Hunt, Iraq’s Excluded
Women, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 2009), https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/27/iraqs-excluded
-women [https://perma.cc/9NY7-5GPF].
96. See infra Section III.B.
97. See supra Part I.
98. See Olwine, supra note 69, at 655.
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the mechanism can have by perpetuating post-conflict instability.99
On the other hand, delaying survivor reintegration could also en-
sure the lack of survivor participation in the first place, and thus,
the eventual failure of the mechanism that currently plagues transi-
tional justice.100 If reintegration is not prioritized as the initial goal
of transitional justice mechanisms, post-conflict societies risk facing
state failure, as these women may turn to criminal networks to find
community and acceptance.101 Such networks may include terrorist
cells, prostitution rings, and drug trafficking.102
B. Two Sides of the Same Coin: Greater Participation or Stagnant
and Declining Participation
Where survivor reintegration is prioritized, two future scenarios
emerge: (1) greater participation of mass wartime rape survivors in
transitional justice mechanisms; or (2) stagnant and declining
participation of mass wartime rape survivors in transitional justice
mechanisms.
Reintegration naturally and inherently encompasses the transi-
tional justice measurements of participation, dignity restoration, and
trust.103 With each possible outcome, a societal response to reinte-
gration determines if the measurements as a whole come out as low
or high.104
Societal responses to reintegration can either be negative or posi-
tive.105 Positive societal response is seen where, after being welcomed
home, reintegration induces a “shift in deeply rooted social attitudes
towards rape and rape survivors.”106 Such a shift emerges due to the
“extreme” scale of mass rape, which induces a “window of opportunity,
or a turning point” for normative beliefs regarding rape.107 Negative
99. “In fact, a 2002 study conducted by the Rwanda Unity and Reconciliation Commis-
sion revealed that women were more than [60] percent less likely to testify to the events
of rape because of the intimate nature of the crime and the associated stigma.” Id. at 654.
100. Id.
101. See Corin Bailey, Exploring Female Motivations for Drug Smuggling on the Island
of Barbados: Evidence From Her Majesty’s Prison, Barbados, 8 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY
117, 129 (2013); Katharina Von Knop, The Female Jihad: Al-Qaeda’s Women, 30 STUD.
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 397, 400 (2007); Bartels, supra note 26, at 44; The Rise of Femicide
and Women in Drug Trafficking, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Oct. 2011), http://www
.coha.org/the-rise-of-femicide-and-women-in-drug-trafficking [https://perma.cc/RR69
-6TNJ] [hereinafter Rise of Femicide].
102. See Bailey, supra note 101, at 130; Bartels, supra note 26, at 44; Von Knop, supra
note 101, at 400; The Rise of Femicide, supra note 101.
103. See Henry, supra note 51, at 119.
104. See Olwine, supra note 69, at 655.
105. See  Jones et al., supra note 9; Madrespeaks, Women Confronting ISIS, supra
note 32.
106. Madrespeaks, Women Confronting ISIS, supra note 32.
107. Id.
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societal response to reintegration is seen where survivors continue
to be silenced and shamed by cultural norms regarding rape as
there has been no shift in such beliefs.108 Survivors fear continued
abuse, social ridicule, and ostracization.109
In the first case, where societal response to reintegration is
positive, a survivor’s acceptance back into her community and family
could provide her with the support needed to encourage participa-
tion and willingness of victim testimony within transitional justice
mechanisms.110 Without familial and community support, the addi-
tional threat of insecurity stemming from intimidation, threats, and
killings of survivors who come forward as witnesses could serve to
silence survivors and ensure the failure of the mechanism.111 Posi-
tive reintegration, therefore, helps to overcome the factors that limit
female participation, such as: fear of retaliation, fear of bringing
shame to the family and community, feelings of complicity, and fear
of further rejection and ostracization.112
However, in the second case, where societal response to reinte-
gration is negative, the reintegration of survivors may lead to the
prioritization of unified communities at the expense of subsequent
goals, such as truth-seeking and reconciliation.113 Women reinte-
grated into their communities may no longer wish to speak their
truth after finally being accepted into their families, thus stifling
other goals of transitional justice by failing to encourage participa-
tion. Thus, negative reintegration cannot help overcome factors that
limit survivor participation, as fear of retaliation, bringing shame,
feelings of shame, and fear of further rejection and ostracization still
exist within this scenario and ultimately silence survivors.114
As a result, the effect of reintegration on the success of transi-
tional justice mechanisms can only be discerned in the former case:
where positive societal response to reintegration fosters greater
participation.115 The remainder of this Section of the Note will focus
on the effects that follow greater participation in regards to dignity
restoration and trust in the mechanism.
The restoration of survivors’ dignity emerges out of the “re-
establish[ment] [of] their self-respect” due to the “fact that their suf-
fering is listened to . . . with respect and sympathy.”116 Though this
108. Supra Part I.
109. Supra Part I.
110. See What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 1.
111. See Olwine, supra note 69, at 654, 660.
112. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
113. See Jones et al., supra note 9, at 2.
114. See Henry, supra note 51, at 120.
115. See supra Section III.B.
116. Henry, supra note 51, at 121.
2020] REINTEGRATION OF FEMALE RAPE SURVIVORS 441
element requires structural remedies to transitional justice mecha-
nisms that are outside the scope of this Note—e.g., the end of hostile
questioning of survivors or the training of judges and prosecutors in
gender-sensitivity—reintegration’s ability to change societal percep-
tions of rape can act as an accountability measure upholding survivor
dignity in the face of prosecutorial or judicial failure to do so.117 More-
over, when more survivors participate in response to their empower-
ment through reintegration, the likelihood that their perpetrators
will be held accountable increases, resulting in a condemnation by
the mechanism.118 Such a condemnation of the perpetrator’s actions
carries great consequences in “lessen[ing] feelings of complicity and
self-blame.”119 Thus, positive reintegration can create a mutually rein-
forcing cycle where greater participation can lead to greater account-
ability, and ultimately, restoration of civic and human dignity.120
Similarly, trust and faith in the ability of the mechanism to
“restor[e] the moral equilibrium” following mass wartime rape can
similarly be bolstered by greater participation’s effect on account-
ability of mechanism authorities.121
IV. WHICH OUTCOME IS MORE LIKELY IN FUTURE CASES?:
THE CASES OF SYRIA AND SOUTH SUDAN
Mass wartime rape is not a historical problem only to be seen in
past cases such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guate-
mala.122 It is a tool of modern war that plagues many of the world’s
nations engulfed in violence and conflict today.123 Currently, wartime
rape is being carried out in approximately ten nations: Syria, Iraq,
Myanmar, Nigeria, Kashmir, Burundi, South Sudan, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Yemen, and the Central African Republic.124
117. Id.
118. Id. at 115.
119. Id. at 121.
120. Id. at 119.
121. Id. at 121–22.
122. See Robert Fisk, Bosnia War Crimes: ‘The Rapes Went on Day and Night’: Robert
Fisk, in Mostar, Gathers Detailed Evidence of the Systematic Sexual Assaults on Muslim
Women by Serbian ‘White Eagle’ Gunmen, INDEP. (Feb. 8, 1993), https://www.indepen
dent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bosnia-war-crimes-the-rapes-went-on-day-and-night
-robert-fisk-in-mostar-gathers-detailed-evidence-of-1471656.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ8A
-RWEV]; Jones et al., supra note 9, at 4; supra text accompanying notes 62–88.
123. See Rape: Weapon of War, U.N.O.H.C.H.R., https://www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents
/pages/rapeweaponwar.aspx [https://perma.cc/EBZ4-H2Y2].
124. See Christian Caryl, Rape is Still Being Used as a Weapon of War. Right Now.
Today., WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy
-post/wp/2017/11/21/rape-is-still-being-used-as-a-weapon-of-war-right-now-today [https://
perma.cc/MZ6T-G9MQ]; Randi Nord, Is What’s Happening in Yemen Really Genocide,
MINT PRESS (June 4, 2018), https://www.mintpressnews.com/yemen-genocide/243247
[https://perma.cc/BHU4-WVRD]; Ewelina U. Ochab, Sexual Violence As a Weapon of
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With the eventual end of hostilities in each of these conflicts
will come the need for transitional justice mechanisms to face the
realities of the conflict. Reintegration should be made the first goal
of such future transitional justice mechanisms in each of these ten
conflicts, as they face the task of unveiling the truth of the use of
mass wartime rape during the war. The remainder of this Note will
provide a hypothesis for such a process to be carried out in post-
conflict Syria and South Sudan.125
The reintegration of rape survivors into post-conflict society is
a relatively new phenomenon that has seen only limited attempt
and success in its lifetime: first in RPF-run Rwanda in the after-
math of the Tutsi Genocide, and now amongst the Yazidi populace
of Iraqi Kurdistan.126 Predicting the outcome of future reintegration
in Syria and South Sudan based on such limited examples proves
difficult.127 However, certain factors regarding community values—
as defined by each nation’s legal system—combined with the reality
on the ground, can predict the most probable result for survivors and
transitional justice.128
These two cases were chosen due to greater indications of po-
litical will by international authorities to begin such processes of
transitional justice in each of these situations.129 For example, since
2015, United Nations war crimes investigators have called for a spe-
cial tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of international crimes in
War: The Story of Daesh and Boko Haram, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2017/03/02/sexual-violence-as-a-weapon-of-war-the-story-of
-daesh-and-boko-haram/#6bc962bb6a17 [https://perma.cc/VVW9-WCYV]; Rebecca Ratcliffe,
Rape is an Instrument of War in Central African Republic Conflict, Finds Study, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/oct/05/rape-instru
ment-of-war-central-african-republic-conflict-study-sexual-slavery [https://perma.cc/29KP
-CBXC]; Nina Wilen & Bert Ingelaere, War-Torn Congo Has Been Called the ‘Rape Capital
of the World.’ Here Is How Fighters Think About Sexual Violence, WASH. POST (Aug. 31,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/28/what-do-rebels
-think-about-sexual-violence-in-congo-we-asked-them [https://perma.cc/KLQ6-2Y3U].
125. See infra Sections IV.A–B.
126. See Susannah George, Yazidi Women Welcomed Back to the Faith, UNHCR
(June 15, 2009), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2015/6/56ec1e9611/yazidi-women
-welcomed-back-to-the-faith.html [https://perma.cc/8XQQ-VX57]; Swanee Hunt, The Rise
of Rwanda’s Women: Rebuilding and Reuniting a Nation, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2014,
at 156, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/rwanda/2014-03-30/rise-rwandas-women
[https://perma.cc/K6QB-T54K]; Madrespeaks, Women Confronting ISIS, supra note 32.
127. See Ward & Marsh, supra note 10.
128. See Hunt, supra note 126, at 155.
129. See Akira Tomlinson, UN Urges South Sudan Government to Create a Hybrid
Court for War Crimes, JURIST (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/09/un
-urges-south-sudan-government-to-create-a-hybrid-court-for-war-crimes [https://perma
.cc/R3NV-KYWD]; Alex Whiting, An Investigation Mechanism for Syria: The General
Assembly Steps into the Breach, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 231, 232 (2017), https://academic
.oup.com/jicj/article/15/2/231/3605019 [https://perma.cc/N65X-77ZG].
2020] REINTEGRATION OF FEMALE RAPE SURVIVORS 443
Syria.130 The U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria has already com-
piled a war crimes suspect list.131 However, the greatest indicator of
will to prosecute Syrian war crimes comes from the U.N. General
Assembly’s passing of Resolution 71/248 in December 2016, which
establishes the “International, Impartial, and Independent Mecha-
nism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Respon-
sible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed
in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011”—otherwise referred
to as the IIIM.132 This marks “the first time that the General Assem-
bly has established such a body to assemble and analyze evidence
of international crimes to a prosecution standard, with the benefit
that the evidence could be preserved for a future tribunal.”133
Similarly, alongside the international community, the U.S. has
urged the government of South Sudan to establish a hybrid tribunal
in the wake of both a peace agreement between its warring factions
and a declaration of amnesty by the President of South Sudan for all
“those who waged war against the government.”134 The peace agree-
ment specifically provides for the creation of a hybrid court consisting
of international and South Sudanese judges to begin transitional
justice processes.135 However, there has been no government cooper-
ation thus far, as both sides continue perpetrating human rights
violations, such as wartime rape.136 In the face of failure for such
prosecutorial methods of transitional justice, attention is turning to
reconciliatory non-prosecutorial forms of transitional justice.137
A. Syria
1. Overview of Wartime Rape Amidst the Syrian Conflict
In March 2011, during the wake of the Arab Uprisings, protests
erupted in Syria after young school boys were detained, tortured, and
130. Julian Borger, Call For Special Tribunal to Investigate War Crimes and Mass
Atrocities in Syria, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015
/mar/17/call-for-special-tribunal-to-investigate-war-crimes-and-mass-atrocities-in-syria
[https://perma.cc/A428-QBMZ].
131. Id.
132. Whiting, supra note 129, at 232.
133. Id.
134. Kevin J. Kelley, US, Human Rights Watchdog Urge Hybrid Court for South Sudan,
EAST AFRICAN (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/US-human-rights
-watchdog-hybrid-court-South-Sudan/4552908-4712272-1kblvbz/index.html [https://perma
.cc/2A9S-QTU7]; see Dimo Silva, South Sudan Government Objects to War Crimes Court,
VOA (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/archive/south-sudan-government-objects
-war-crimes-court [https://perma.cc/93G4-UHSN]; Tomlinson, supra note 129.
135. Kelley, supra note 134.
136. See id.
137. See Silva, supra note 134.
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killed in response to their show of support for the uprisings occur-
ring in Syria’s neighboring countries of Tunisia and Egypt.138 The
country soon after became engulfed in a civil war that has claimed
the lives of more than 465,000 Syrians, injuring over a million, and
displacing over twelve million—based on numbers from April 2018.139
Amongst those killed, injured, and displaced are the thousands of
women and girls—Christians, Yazidi, Kurdish, Arab, Armenian, and
Muslims alike—whose bodies have been used as a battlefield by
rebel groups, President Bashar al-Assad’s government forces, and
Islamist terrorist forces such as the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Nusra
or Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.140 While exact numbers of rape and sexual
violence are nearly impossible to determine due to the silence sur-
rounding this crime in general, and the difficulty of wartime docu-
mentation specifically, it is undeniable that sexual violence against
women and girls has been a “core component of the armed groups’
ideology and economic strategy in . . . Syria.”141
2. Post-Conflict Syria and Future Reintegration
Since 2015, Yifat Susskind, Executive Director of MADRE, an
international women’s human rights organization, has spoken of a
“subtle but critical shift” in cultural norms surrounding rape and
rape survivors on the ground in Syria and Iraq as a result of the
“sheer number of women who have suffered sexual violence.”142 A
“tipping point” could thus emerge within Syrian and Iraqi societies,
she argues, leading to the rejection of cultural stigmas towards rape.143
Yanar Mohammed, an Iraqi women’s rights activist, reasons, “[i]t’s
harder to blame a woman for having been raped when it’s happening
to so many.”144
138. Syria’s Civil War Explained from the Beginning, AL-JAZEERA (Apr. 14, 2018), https:/
/www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html [https://
perma.cc/4Z3U-K4XQ].
139. Id. (numbers based on March 2019 estimates).
140. See generally Human Rights Council, “I Lost My Dignity”: Sexual and Gender-
Based Violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc A/HRC/37/CRP.3 (Mar. 8, 2018),
[hereinafter Human Rights Council, I Lost My Dignity].
141. Investigating Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes—Lessons from
Iraq and Syria, UN WOMEN (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories
/2017/10/news-event-wps-investigating-conflict-related-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes
[https://perma.cc/T2JL-VB3C].
142. Yifat Susskind, What Will It Take to Stop ISIS Using Rape as a Weapon of War?,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/feb/17
/disarm-isis-rape-weapon-war [https://perma.cc/STT4-LKJH]; see Meet Madre, MADRE,
https://www.madre.org/meet-madre [https://perma.cc/4TDX-DV4X]; Madrespeaks, Women
Confronting ISIS, supra note 32.
143. Susskind, supra note 142.
144. Id.
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Such change is currently undeniable within Iraq’s Yazidi com-
munity where IS has carried out mass abductions, forced conversions,
and rape of Yazidi women and girls.145 In response to these deliberate
and targeted attacks, Yazidi spiritual leader, Khurto Hajji Ismail—
“Baba Sheikh”—issued an edict instructing Yazidi families and com-
munities to welcome and accept rape survivors, namely those abducted
by IS and forced into a sex slave trade where they were converted to
Islam—a formerly unpardonable sin in the Yazidi faith.146 This mea-
sure effectively ended the practice of ostracization, rejection, and
honor killings in response to rape within the Yazidi community
upon survivors’ return.147 Such a phenomenon mirrors post-genocide
Rwanda, where the “critical mass of [rape] survivors triggered” new
national norms on gender-based violence and women’s rights.148
While Susskind’s prediction of a change in cultural response to
rape implicates the entirety of Iraq and Syria, supporting evidence
seems to only point to Yazidi progress.149 However, Yazidis are not
the only demographic within Syria affected by mass wartime rape.150
IS and other extremist groups have similarly targeted Christian
populations around Aleppo, Damascus, and Northeast Syria, while
government forces have raped women and girls during house raids
in opposition territory, within detention centers, and at checkpoints.151
Rape thus has affected the whole of the Syrian female populace:
Christians, Yazidis, and the majority-Muslim populace.152
With Muslims accounting for eighty-seven percent of the popu-
lation, the Islamic faith and its views regarding rape are an important
lens through which to predict the Syrian people’s response to reinte-
gration of rape survivors.153 Islam denounces six shameful practices,
or fahisha, collectively known as the hudud.154 Unlawful sexual con-
duct, or zina, is one of the shameful practices that Islam condemns.155
Rape is also included in this category of unlawful sexual conduct—
comprising both the rapist and the survivor as perpetrators of such
145. See id.
146. George, supra note 126; Madrespeaks, Women Confronting ISIS, supra note 32.
147. George, supra note 126; Madrespeaks, Women Confronting ISIS, supra note 32.
148. Susskind, supra note 142; see Hunt, supra note 126.
149. See George, supra note 126; Susskind, supra note 142.
150. See Human Rights Council, I Lost My Dignity, supra note 140, at 4.
151. Id. at 5, 13–14.
152. See generally Human Rights Council, I Lost My Dignity, supra note 140.
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a shameful act.156 Syrian Muslim social norms against rape thus stem
from such an understanding of rape within the context of zina, which
has traditionally led to the prevalence of norms against rape survi-
vors.157 These beliefs can escalate to the point of honor killings of
survivors or of forced marriages to survivors’ rapists.158
This reality is further reflected in Syrian laws, where the defini-
tion of rape set forth in the Syrian Penal Code resembles the definition
of zina.159 While the rape or sexual assault of a survivor below the
age of twelve can result in a minimum nine years of hard labor and
a maximum twenty-one-year conviction, Article 508 establishes that
the rape of an adult woman can effectively go unpunished if the
perpetrator and survivor marry and do not divorce within five years’
time.160 Article 508 is thus a codification of the social pressure felt
by female Syrian survivors of rape to enter into forced marriage.161
However, within the context of civil war, such an option may not
even be possible as the chaos of conflict moves offenders to new
battle-fronts.162
In 2017, documentary director Manon Loizeau released Syrie: La
Guerra Silencieuse, or The Silent War, compiling the stories of Syrian
women raped by government forces during the ongoing strife.163 One
woman describes the situation of Syrian women, particularly Mus-
lim Syrian women, as being “trapped between traditions on one side
156. See id. at 170.
157. Comm. to End All Forms Of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Rep. on
Women’s Human Rights Violations in Syria Before and During the Conflict, https://tb
internet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/SYR/INT_CEDAW_NGO
_SYR_17381_E.pdf.
158. See id.
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arts. 489, 490] (Syria), with Quran, Al Isra 17:32, Al-Nur 24:2–4, https://quran.com/17
[https://perma.cc/BY9J-NY8J] and https://quran.com/24 [https://perma.cc/LV3M-MX2C].
See also Joseph Williams, Justice for Syria: A Human Rights Review of the Syrian Penal
Code, 34 (Dec. 2013), https://law.vanderbilt.edu/academics/academic-programs/interna
tional-legal-studies/Justice-for-Syria-Project.pdf.
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699.htm [https://perma.cc/WFQ8-3P5S]; Rebecca Murray, Syria: Getting Away Legally With
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and the regime on the other.”164 Testimonials such as these seem to
hint towards a lack of change in norms regarding rape outside the
Yazidi community.165 As a result, the current reality facing survi-
vors seems to predict that Syria is more likely to experience the
second outcome, as described above, in the face of future reintegra-
tion attempts where, assuming survivors are reintegrated, societal
response will nonetheless be negative, thus inhibiting successful
transitional justice procedures as they relate to mass wartime rape
by obstructing possible participation, dignity restoration, and trust.166
B. South Sudan
1. Overview of Wartime Rape Within the South Sudanese
Conflict
Following its independence from Sudan in 2011, friction emerged
between the governing authorities of the new nation and their respec-
tive ethnic groups when President Salva Kirr, an ethnic Dinka, sus-
pected his deputy, Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, of a plot to overthrow
him in a coup, sending the nation into civil war in 2013.167 A report
published by the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine places
the death toll at 383,000 people in the five years of the conflict.168
Pramila Patten, U.N. Special Representative on Sexual Violence and
Conflict, described the use of rape in this conflict as a “lethal tactic of
war” that has effected thousands of women and children.169 A shocking
U.N. Human Rights report states 232 civilians were killed and 120
women and girls raped during an offensive against forty villages by
government forces and allied militias between April 16, 2018 and
May 24, 2018 in Unity state, an opposition-held region.170 Moreover,
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.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25427965 [https://perma.cc/88ZV-EEK6].
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in the first half of 2018 alone, nearly 2,300 cases of sexual assault
were reported with 20 percent of cases involving children.171
2. Post-Conflict South Sudan and Future Reintegration
Like nearly all African nations, South Sudan exhibits a plural-
ist legal system based on a mixture of statutory and customary
law.172 In the case of South Sudan, customary law, as an “expression
of the customs, beliefs, and practices of the people,” provides a lens
by which to measure the effectiveness of reintegration in post-conflict
society due to its functionality as not just “legal protocol” but “social
convention.”173
Regardless of the existence of a formal, statutory legal system,
the informal, customary legal tradition has been the “principal source
of social order . . . [and] law in contemporary [South] Sudan” with
more than ninety percent of disputes handled by traditional authori-
ties practicing customary law, such as tribe chiefs.174 The core ten-
ants of this legal tradition are reconciliation between the “wronged
and wrongdoer,” and cohesion and stability of the community over
which it governs—sometimes at the expense of truth and justice.175
Prioritization of reconciliation in this way devalues the rights of the
individual, particularly for women and girls, in the face of the good
of the family and society.176
For example, during times of peace, when a woman or girl is
raped and the case appears before traditional authorities under the
customary system, it is often “talked through”177 as a problem be-
tween families that should be settled through money transfers, pro-
vision of goods or services such as “medical care and compensation
171. South Sudan: UN Says Over 150 Women, Girls Raped in 12 Days, AL-JAZEERA
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(Sept. 2018), https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Sudan1 .html [https://perma
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for economic loss,” or even apologies to the family.178 Such traditions
can be inconsistent with human rights norms generally, and women’s
rights specifically, as they can be “considered . . . mechanisms to
control and manage women.”179
The civil war in South Sudan, however, encompasses strife be-
tween members of different communities, tribes, and groups, such that
customary law may prove less useful and successful, as a soldier who
rapes is usually from a different community than the survivor.180
Without the ability to follow traditional protocol of reconciliation in
response to the survivor’s rape,181 it becomes possible that South
Sudan could be left with no other alternative than reintegration.
Nonetheless, it is more likely that within a customary system where
community unity is shattered due to rape, and a woman is no longer
able to fulfil her role of cementing family ties through marriage and
reproduction as a result of her rape, societal response may be nega-
tive towards her reintegration.182 This theory is further bolstered by
noting the lack of change in community response to rape and rape
survivors following the conflict between the Sudanese government
forces from Khartoum and those of southern Sudan during the over
twenty-year civil conflict that engulfed the nation of Sudan prior to
the creation of the state of South Sudan in 2011.183
Thus, like the norms of Islamic communities, customary law
refuses to acknowledge a criminal wrong has been perpetrated.184
Rather, it continues to see survivors as a mechanism for community,
and therefore, values destruction.185 Mirroring post-conflict Syria,
South Sudan’s negative reintegration can lead to stifling survivor
participation, dignity restoration, and ultimate trust in transitional
justice mechanisms.186
CONCLUSION
While the predictions set out for Syria and South Sudan leave
a bleak hope for the success of future transitional justice mecha-
nisms in unveiling the realities of mass wartime rape during conflict
178. Stephen Lubkemann et al., Unintended Consequences: Constraint of Customary
Justice in Post-Conflict Liberia, in CUSTOMARY JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN WAR-
TORN SOCIETIES 223 (Deborah Isser, ed., 2011).
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180. See Specia, supra note 168.
181. See Mennen, supra note 172, at 241.
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and achieving justice for survivors, it is important to recall three
points. First, conflict in both nations has not ceased.187 As a result,
these predictions can be difficult to make with absolute certainty.
Second, as mass wartime rape continues in these conflicts, the pos-
sibility for Susskind’s believed turning point becomes more likely to
emerge, as mass wartime rape tragically encompasses a greater
percentage of women and girls with each passing day.188 Finally,
prior to the beginning of post-conflict reconstruction and the onset
of transitional justice, it remains possible to alter negative community
reactions into positive ones through the work of global and local lead-
ers, advocacy networks, and non-governmental organizations chang-
ing the culturally accepted narrative and understanding surrounding
rape and rape survivors.189
While this Note maintains that reintegration must be prioritized
in order for transitional justice mechanisms to be more successful,
reintegration is not the only factor that can ensure the success of
such mechanisms,190 but is rather an overlooked one that this Note
seeks to highlight. International law authorities should continue to
ensure that each mechanism provides a safe environment and is
supportive to survivors willing to share their story through means
such as gender-trained judges, lawyers, and officials, options for in
camera testimony, and much more. Reintegration is merely the first
step of many that the international community must begin to take
to provide survivors and their communities with effective transi-
tional justice, reconciliation, and truth.
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